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ABSTRACT
This article examines the economic basis for what is termed “rational discounting,” which entails
full recognition of policy effects over time and exponential discounting at a riskless rate of return.
Policies often cannot be ranked unambiguously in terms of their present or future orientation. Both
failure to discount and preferential intergenerational discounting generate inconsistencies and
economic anomalies. Office of Management and Budget discounting guidelines now stipulate more
reasonable discount rates than earlier guidelines, but err in permitting open-ended preferential rates
for intergenerational effects. The article presents a methodology  for monetizing the value of
statistical life for people of different ages and at different points in time. Review of regulatory
analyses indicates increased consistency of discounting practices. However, examination of two
policies with intergenerational effects, stratospheric ozone regulation and nuclear waste storage at
Yucca  Mountain,  reveal  failures  to  adopt  a  rational  discounting  approach.  The  influence  of
behavioral anomalies such as hyperbolic discounting may make full recognition of intertemporal
effects in benefit-cost analysis more consequential than the use of preferential discount rates.
W. Kip Viscusi
Vanderbilt Law School




1.  Introduction 
Intergenerational discounting should be no different than within-generation 
discounting.  The policy position I will advocate in this article is that distant benefits and 
costs should be recognized fully in the policy analysis process, but that they should be 
weighted based on the same discount rate methodology that is applied to effects on the 
current generation. 
The impetus for a preferential rate may stem in part from the dramatic 
mathematics of exponential discounting.  Let the discount rate be r and policy benefits 
and costs at time t be weighted by the discount factor 1 / (1 + r)
t.
1  Suppose the value of r 
is 3 percent.  Then benefits a year from now will have a weight of 0.97, benefits two 
years from now will have a weight of 0.94, and so on.  By the time one reaches twenty 
years in the future, which might well be the latency period for cancer risks from some 
environmental exposures, the discount factor is 0.55, or benefits and costs are weighted at 
just over half of their within-period value.  Likewise, the discount factor becomes 0.23 
after 50 years, 0.05 after 100 years, and 1.45 x 10
-13 for effects 1000 years in the future.  
For the very distant future, all but the most consequential benefits and costs will drop out 
of the analysis.
2  The discount weight pattern is a straightforward consequence of valuing 
all policy effects using a consistent discounting approach and need not be a cause for 
alarm. 
Thoughtful commentators who advocate a preferential discount rate for future 
generations have framed the issue in a manner that creates a bias toward thinking of what 
                                                 
1 This formula can be found in a variety of basic texts. See, for example, footnote 7, p. 244 of Howell E. 
Jackson et al., Analytical Methods for Lawyers, (New York: Foundation Press, 2003). 
2 For expressions of concern about this effect, see Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, “Pricing the 
Priceless,” 150 U. Pa. L. Rev (2002), at 1571. 3 
lower rate should be applied to effects on future generations.
3  Thus, the question that is 
posed is whether society should use the same discount rate for all policy benefits and 
costs, or whether a lower rate should be used in the future.  Indeed, the main policy issue 
in their view is how much lower should the discount rate be for effects on future 
generations? 
Rather than framing the intergenerational discounting question in terms of 
preferential lower rates, I would like to frame the policy evaluation question in a more 
fundamental way.  Should effects on future generations even be considered in the policy 
evaluation process?  Why not set their values equal to zero?  Notwithstanding the 
possibility of constructing hypothetical social welfare functions in which the welfare of 
future generations matters, the current generation’s policy choice task is much simpler.  
How do we make choices now to maximize our own discounted well-being?  The well-
being of future generations may enter our utility functions, or it might not.  Some people 
may care about future generations in an altruistic manner, but perhaps not a great deal.  
Per capita income levels and living standards have risen over time, and if the past is any 
guide, future generations will be more affluent and better off economically than we are, 
just as we have had a higher standard of living than past generations.  The current 
citizenry consequently may feel quite justified in taking a within-generation perspective 
and might not be too moved by the plight of their more affluent, distant descendants. 
The degree to which personal self interest may have profound consequences for 
future generations is reflected in the public’s attitude toward climate change policies. 
Efforts to combat global warming through gas taxes will necessarily have a deferred 
                                                 
3 A superb advocacy of intergenerational preferences is Richard L. Revesz, “Environmental Regulation, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives,” Columbia Law Review 99(4) (1999), 1015-
1016. 4 
impact on global climate change, which is a long term environmental problem. To what 
extent will older age groups be willing to pay more for gasoline so that gasoline will be 
less harmful to the environment? The analysis of the Eurobarometer survey data by 
Hersch and Viscusi found that concern with this environmental amenity declined steadily 
with age, which reflects the degree to which there is a strong component of self interest 
governing the public’s willingness to pay for environmental benefits over time. More 
specifically, in terms of the additional percent amount that respondents were willing to 
pay for gasoline, the average response was a high value of 2.8 percent among those age 
15-34, 2.3 percent for those 35-44, 2.1 percent for those 45-54, 1.6 for those 55-64, and 
1.0 percent for those 65 and over.
4 This dramatic dropoff in valuation led the authors to 
conclude that there is a “generational divide in support for environmental policies.”
5 
If people are self interested in the extreme, they might place no value whatsoever 
on the well-being of future generations. From the standpoint of their policy assessments, 
concerns about what discount rate should be used to value effects on future generations is 
irrelevant. If the effects are treated as having zero value, the discounting of these 
consequences does not enter. By including intergenerational effects in our policy 
evaluation calculus, we have already made perhaps substantial headway toward placing a 
substantial value on interests subsequent generations have in today’s policies. 
Matters might of course be quite different if future generations could bribe us to 
make sacrifices now to advance their interests.  But we do not know what their 
preferences are, and there is no mechanism by which they can transfer resources to us.  
                                                 
4 See Table 1 of Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, “The Generational Divide in Support for Environmental 
Policies: European Evidence,” NBER Working Paper No. 11859 (2005), forthcoming in Climatic Change, 
2006. 
5 Id., title page. 5 
Legislatures can run budget deficits to shift costs to the future, but these are not targeted 
to advance specific policies that future generations have selected.  Thus, the extreme 
present generation approach is to value future generation effects at zero and to use 
conventional discounting for current generation effects. 
The reference point I will adopt for my article does not embody intergenerational 
preference or intergenerational neglect.  Rather, I will assume that we treat effects on 
future generations in a manner that is consistent with the discounting approach applied to 
outcomes within our own generation.  These future effects will be recognized fully and 
brought back to present value with no deduction from the benefits, even though current 
populations will not be directly affected.  Benefits and costs to future generations will 
have the same standing as effects on the current generation.  This symmetrical treatment 
already embodies a quite strong degree of altruism toward future generations that might 
greatly exceed the current citizenry’s actual valuation of future generations’ welfare.  
However, just as intergenerational discounting preferences will create anomalies and 
inconsistencies, it is straightforward to show that intergenerational discounting neglect 
will create parallel problems.  Using the same discount rate r symmetrically for all policy 
benefits and costs will be my policy evaluation reference point.   
Before considering the appropriate intergenerational policy, I will first examine 
how discount rates affect the future orientation and the environmental responsiveness of 
the policy. Each of these matters may be unclear unless sufficient structure is imposed on 
the policy choice. I then consider anomalies arising from failure to discount, which is 
perhaps the extreme example of intergenerational preference, and use of preferable 
discount rates for policies affecting future generations. These discounting practices and 6 
those currently in use for regulatory analysis will lead to irrational economic 
consequences and intertemporal inconsistencies. Finally, the article examines the 
behavioral anomalies that affect people’s discounting behavior. Because of the 
irrationalities of individual discounting, there is likely to be inadequate policy emphasis 
on efforts with deferred benefits. Thus, the major policy deficiency may be a failure to 
value policies with long-term effects by the same extent as people would do if they had 
rational intertemporal preferences. 
 
2.  Discounting and Temporal Orientation 
2.1  The Ambiguity of Temporal Orientation 
Increasing the discount rate necessarily reduces the discount weight placed on 
future costs and benefits.
6  Because costs and benefits that occur immediately are not 
discounted at all, higher discount rates necessarily place a lower relative value on future 
costs and benefits.  Researchers often attempt to characterize policies as being more or 
less present-oriented.
7 However, before getting into discounting issues in great detail, it is 
worthwhile to explore whether this simple intuition of present or future orientation is 
always a useful way to categorize policies. 
In many policy choice contexts, a higher rate of discount will generate 
calculations that are less favorable to judgments of the policy’s net attractiveness.  
Suppose all policy costs occur at the outset, and that all benefits are deferred.  It is useful 
to think in terms of the trajectory of net benefits, where net benefits in year t equal the 
                                                 
6 My analysis adopts the benefit-cost criterion for policy choice. For a different approach, based on growth 
maximization, see Tyler Cowen, “Caring about the Distant Future: Why It Matters and what It Means,” 
2006, this issue. 
7 The role of discounting with respect to emphasis on policy effects for future generations is emphasized by 
Revesz, supra note 3, at 946. 7 
difference in the benefits bt in year t and costs ct in year t.  The time path of (bt – ct) is 
initially negative and then is positive.  For this simple example, there is one sign reversal 
in the pattern of net benefits over time.  In such situations, increasing the discount rate 
will decrease the present value of benefits by a greater relative amount than they will 
decrease costs, which are more immediate.   
Within the set of possible policies that begin with negative net benefits followed 
by periods of positive net benefits, there will be differences in the timing and duration of 
the positive net benefit period.  Policies in which the net benefits are more immediate will 
be viewed as present-oriented, while policies with deferred net benefits might be termed 
future-oriented.  This simple characterization of policies is an apt description of very 
well-behaved trajectories of benefits and costs.   
In more complex patterns of costs and benefits, the appealing logic of one policy 
being more future-oriented than another does not hold up.  To see how the ambiguity in 
the ranking of temporal orientation arises, consider the closely related concept of the 
internal rate of return, which I will call i.
8  The internal rate of return i is the rate of 
discount at which the present value of the difference between benefits and costs of the 
policy is zero.  For a conventional regulatory policy, one might expect the present value 
of net benefits to be positive for low rates of discount and negative for high rates of 
discount that are above the value of i.  For these payoff streams, the net payoffs are 
initially negative and then turn positive, so that there is one sign reversal.  Support of a 
lower discount rate consequently pushes the policy discussion into a region in which the 
                                                 
8 A standard definition of the internal rate of return concept appears in Jackson et al., supra note 1, at 247-
249. 8 
policy is more attractive, as there is no ambiguity in the temporal orientation of the 
policy. 
Matters become more complicated in situations in which there is more than one 
sign reversal in the time problem of net benefits.  In these instances, there can be multiple 
values of i that generate a zero present value.
9  The number of such values of i cannot be 
greater than the number of sign reversals in the payoff stream.  As a consequence, for the 
simple payoff stream that begins with negative net benefits followed by positive net 
benefits, there is only one internal rate of return.  With more than one sign reversal in the 
payoff stream, there can be multiple internal rates of return.  The phenomenon of multiple 
internal rates of return is known as “reswitching.”  In such instances, there may be no 
simple way to assess the present-orientedness of the policy.  Similarly, if one compares 
the difference in benefits and costs of two policies, there may well be multiple sign 
reversals in those differences.  Thus, it may not be possible to employ a simple policy 
choice rule such as choosing policy A at low discount rates or choosing policy B at high 
discount rates.   
The reswitching phenomenon may be particularly important in environmental 
contexts.  In an early paper, Richard Zeckhauser and I showed that the presence of 
irreversibilities, which are endemic to environmental decisions, may induce situations of 
reswitching: policy B is preferred to policy A at low values of r and high values of r but 
not at intermediate values.
10  The presence of uncertainty of a possible environmental 
irreversibility, which is also a common characteristic of environmental choices, also may 
                                                 
9 For an early exploration of the reswitching issue, see Paul Samuelson, “Some Aspects of the Pure Theory 
of Capital,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 51, 469-496 (1937), and Paul Samuelson, “A Summing Up,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 80, 563-583 (1966). 
10 W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser, “Environmental Policy Choice Under Uncertainty,” Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 3 (1976), 103. 9 
induce such reswitching.
11  Ranking policies in terms of the degree to which they are 
present-oriented or future-oriented consequently may not be a straightforward exercise, 
as it is complicated by the influence of crossing payoff streams, the effect of 
irreversibilities, and the role of uncertainty.
 12  A preferable approach is to select the 
discount rate that is appropriate and determine which policies generate the greatest 
present value of the spread between benefits and costs. 
As a result, there will be two principal features of my treatment of appropriate 
discounting policies.  First, the focus will be on the choice of the appropriate discount 
rate irrespective of whether doing so should be characterized as being more present-
oriented or more future-oriented.  Second, before characterizing policies as being more or 
less future-oriented, it is essential that the time pattern of payoffs meets the requisite 
criteria for such simple designations.  When benefit and cost streams are complex, there 
may be no unambiguous ranking of policies in terms of their temporal emphasis. 
 
2.2  Are Low Discount Rates Pro-Environment? 
Whether a low or high discount rate is pro-environment is also not well-defined in 
general.  Even if it is clear that a policy is more future-oriented, that temporal orientation 
does not imply that the policy is more pro-environment.  Current destruction of natural 
wilderness areas to provide longer-term timber production or oil and natural gas reserves 
will impose environmental costs now and in the future, with deferred intermediate 
financial gains.  If there are negative net benefits in the near term, positive net benefits in 
                                                 
11 Id. at 105-108. 
12 For further discussion of the role of irreversibilities more generally, Dexter Samida and David A. 
Weisbach, “Paretian Intergenerational Discounting,” University of Chicago Law School Working Paper 
2005, this issue. 10 
the intermediate term, and negative net benefits in the distant future, such a pattern of 
costs and benefits fits the reswitching profile, with possibly two internal rates of return 
and no unambiguous temporal ranking. 
Even with more well-behaved benefit and cost trajectories, a higher discount rate 
may be the pro-environment approach.  My involvement with environmental issues began 
with a critique of the dam building operations by the U.S. Department of Interior’s 
Bureau of Reclamation.
13  That agency, which is the Western counterpart of the Army 
Corps of Engineers, has built dams that are engineering marvels, such as the Hoover 
Dam.  However, even after most of the good sites for dams had been used up, the agency 
continued to construct new dams and sought to build dams in the Grand Canyon.
14  Less 
catastrophic but actual environmental harms have resulted from dams that the Bureau has 
built, including the flooding of scenic areas, fish kills, and salinity problems.
15  The 
agency did not monetize these environmental effects, so that there was no environmental 
discounting issue to consider. 
Dams are highly capital-intensive projects.  As the rate of discount is increased, 
the present value of the benefits are reduced, while the costs are not much affected.  As a 
result, the agency historically showed a preference for using low discount rates, such as 
2.5 percent.
16  Because a higher discount rate would make its policies appear less 
attractive from a benefit-cost standpoint, the agency resisted efforts to bring the discount 
rate in line with rates recommended by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
                                                 
13 Richard L. Berkman and W. Kip Viscusi, Damming the West (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973). 
14 Id. at 75-76, 117-118. 
15 Id. at 29-77. 
16 Id. at 229. 11 
(OMB).
17  Recommendations that a higher discount rate be used would lead fewer 
projects to pass a benefit-cost test, which in this instance would mean less environmental 
harm.  Thus, for these public works projects with adverse environmental effects, use of a 
higher discount rate was a mechanism for deterring these efforts.
18  Advocacy of a higher 
discount rate was the pro-environment policy position. 
A quite interesting intertemporal tradeoff arose with respect to the 1992 Food and 
Drug Administration approval of the drug Taxol, which is used to treat ovarian cancer.
19  
This drug, which was manufactured from the Pacific yew tree, would lead to the saving 
of lives in the near term.  However, cutting down the trees now will lead to depletion of 
the stock of Pacific yew trees and long-term environmental harm.  Is the more 
responsible risk-reducing policy the one that saves lives or trees, and if it is trees, what 
discount rate should be used to assess the future value of the trees?  Fortunately, the 
availability of hybrid yews and semi-synthetic Taxol diminished the controversy, but the 
fundamental point remains.  Often ranking policies that have environmental effects over 
time in terms of the degree to which they reduce risk or are pro-environment is not a 
simple matter, in this case because of competing risk concerns across time. 
 
3.  Discounting Anomalies 
3.1  Problems with Failures to Discount
20 
                                                 
17 Id. at 88-89. 
18 Id, at 89. 
19 W. Kip Viscusi, “Discounting Health Effects for Medical Decisions,” in Frank Sloan, ed., Valuing 
Health Care Costs, Benefits, and Effectiveness for Pharmaceuticals and Other Medical Technologies, 
Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1995, p.127.. 
20 For a detailed exploration of claims that discounting leads to problematic and immoral results, see David 
Samida and David A. Weisbach, supra note 12. 12 
If policy effects are not discounted, it will generate several anomalies, and it is 
worthwhile to review them here.
21  I will focus on four anomalies to give a sense of the 
fundamental problems that will be encountered.  More subtle inconsistencies, such as 
those that I discuss with respect to intergenerational discounting, also may arise. 
The first problem is what I have called the “permanent cost slam dunk.”
22  
Suppose that a development policy will lead to the permanent loss of some very 
inconsequential environmental amenity that has a value of $1 in each period.  With that 
loss extended for an infinite time horizon, the present value of the environmental harm is 
infinite.  No policy criterion with a finite payoff can ever offer great enough benefits to 
offset this infinite loss.  In contrast, with discounting, the infinite stream of $1 losses has 
a present value of only 1 / r, or $33 with a 3 percent discount rate.
23 
The second problem with zero discount rates is that it is always desirable to defer 
policies if that same policy opportunity will be available in the future.  Let policy A save 
33 statistical lives this year at a cost of $100 million, so that it costs just over $3 million 
to save a statistical life.  Let policy B take effect one year later.  It too could save 33 
statistical lives at a cost of $100 million.  However, if we take our $100 million today and 
invest it at the rate r of 3 percent, then we will have $103 million to spend on saving lives 
next year.  At a cost per life saved of $3 million, we can now save 34 lives if we wait till 
next year.  Whether our policy criterion is a benefit-cost test or simply saving lives, 
waiting is always the superior choice when there is no discounting, and there is a positive 
interest rate. 
                                                 
21 I present a more detailed discussion of these in Viscusi, supra note 19, at 134-136. 
22 Id. at 136. 
23 This formula for valuing an infinite stream of payoffs appears in footnote 9, p. 246 of Jackson et al., 
supra note 1. 13 
Third, if there are technological changes that will make future policies more 
effective in saving lives, as with improved pollution control technologies for cars, waiting 
is always superior.  Suppose policy A saves 33 lives this year for $100 million, but policy 
C entails expenditure of $100 million next year and will save 34 lives in 100 years.  Even 
without investing the $100 million to boost it to $103 million in year 2, policy C will 
dominate, despite having to wait a century for the life-saving benefits. 
Fourth, benefits from any given policy action will rise as well.  A positive income 
elasticity of demand for risk-reducing policies of various kinds by definition will lead to a 
higher willingness to pay for these same policy outcomes in the future.  If benefit values 
grow at some finite growth rate g, then the unit benefit value in t years will be (1 + g)
t.  
As t goes to infinity, these unit benefit values likewise become infinite.  As long as there 
is any positive annual growth rate in benefits, however small, the benefit value becomes 
infinite if there is no discounting. 
Serious economic discussions do not suggest that zero discount rates are 
appropriate; however, particularly in policy contexts, there might be suggestions that we 
don’t discount lifesaving benefits or effects on future generations.  The anomalies that 
arise from not discounting are quite general.  There are no special case exemptions from a 
rational discounting approach. 
 
3.2  The Problematic Mathematics of Intergenerational Discounting 
Most discussions of the consequences of discounting for the environment focus 
on long-term policies, often including discounting of effects on future generations.  A 
higher discount rate necessarily gives effects on future generations a lower weight.  In a 14 
paradigmatic case of benefits from activities now and in the near term with 
environmental damage being imposed on future generations, there will be no sign 
reversals of the environmental cost trajectory.  A lower discount rate always enhances the 
weight placed on future generation effects.  Whether a preferential discount rate is 
desirable in such contexts is a quite different matter. 
While it is seemingly simple to suggest that one might use a lower discount rate 
for policy benefits and costs for future generations, the possible policy consequences of 
doing so are problematic.  At a more basic level, it is not even clear what might be meant 
operationally by using a lower rate of time preference for future generations.  As the 
exploration of the various possibilities below will illustrate, none of the seemingly 
plausible interpretations of time inconsistent discounting leads to reasonable behavior.  
For concreteness, I will assume that the appropriate discount rate for current generation 
effects is r and that the opportunity cost of capital does not change over time.
24   Also, let 
the current generation live for 50 years.  The timing of the arrival of these “future 
generations” and the duration of a generation is not well specified by advocates of the 
intergenerational preference approach.  Are we talking about 50 years, 100 years, 1000 
years?  I will leave aside this ambiguity and assume that the switch to future generations 
is well defined.  For simplicity I have assumed that there is only one future generation, 
but the discussion can easily be generalized to multiple future generations.   
Table 1 summarizes four primary categories of different discounting possibilities.  
The first row designates policies that only have effects on the current generation.  For 
these policies with benefits bt and costs ct in year t, the discount rate is r, as under current 
                                                 
24 For a review of discounting theory and the conditions under which the utility discount rate is equal to the 
consumption discount rate see Geoffrey Heal, “Discounting: A Review of Basic Economics,” 2006, this 
issue. 15 







t t ) r 1 ( ) c b ( .  (1) 
The second row of Table 1 pertains to policy decisions that future generations will 
make at the time when the future generation begins.  As with current policy guidelines, 
these future generations will be making within-generation choices by discounting both 
benefits and costs at a rate r.  For simplicity let the future generation’s time horizon be 
infinite, so that there are only two generations in the model.  From their within-generation 







t t ) r 1 ( ) c b ( .  (2) 
The first row of Table 1 pertains to the discounting practices of the current 
generation consistent with equation 1, while the second row shows the future 
generation’s counterpart decisions following the same standard discounting principles.  
Both the first and second rows of Table 1 are consistent with conventional discounting 
practices.  Similarly, if one were to evaluate policies affecting both current and future 
generations using standard discounting practices, one would use a discount rate r for both 
periods. 
The third policy row in Table 1 consists of policy decisions by the current 
generation that affect future generations.  Under this approach, there is discounting of all 
effects on the current generation by a discount rate r, but future generation effects receive 
a preferential discount rate r'  < r.  This approach provides for a policy preference for 
consequences affecting future generations. 16 
Two variants of this future preference must be distinguished.  The first variant is 
case 3i in Table 1, which has a preferential discount rate for effects starting when the 
future generation begins, which in my example is year 51, but this shift in discount rates 
does not affect the within-generational values.  The assumption that r'  < r will apply in 
year 51 in the future is of course quite arbitrary.   
Thus, the policy criterion is 
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This approach creates undesirable effects at the year in which the current generation ends 
and the next generation begins.  The policy effects at the last year of the current 
generation will have a value (b50 – c50) / (1 + r)
50, whereas the first year of the next 
generation will have effects with a value (b51 – c51) / (1 + r' )
51.  So if the value of (b50 – 
c50) equals (b51 – c51), then the policy effects in year 51 will have a greater present value 
than the effects in year 50.  Much the same reasoning applies to other future generation 
effects.  This approach disadvantages distant members of the current generation relative 
to the future generation.  The attractive feature of this approach is that the policy effects 
that occur within the future generation effects are being valued in the same way that 
future generations themselves would value these effects.   
Policy 3ii also begins at preferential discount rate r'  for the future generation and 
continues to use that rate thereafter.  This policy criterion is 
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The formulation in policy 3ii introduces a new problem not shared by policy 3i: the 17 
effects within the future generation are valued at a discount rate r' , which is inconsistent 
with the future generation’s own rate of time preference r. 
The final row in Table 1 illustrates what advocates of the preferential discount 
rate approach for future generations more typically have in mind and which is embodied 
in the policy practices discussed below.  If a policy has consequences for the current 
generation and future generations, then all policy benefits and costs are discounted at a 







t t ) ' r 1 ( ) c b ( .  (5) 
This approach does not create the across-generational inconsistencies as with the third 
discounting policy.  However, it does create problems within generations.  Suppose the 
policy has modest effects on future generations and that the preponderance of the benefits 
are to the current generation.  Then the preferential discount rate r'  may make the present 
value of the policy with future generational effects greater than that of superior current 
policies valued using rate r.  Similarly, suppose that all policy effects are to future 
generations and are discounted at a rate r' .  Then the policy ranking obtained using policy 
4 with discount rate r'  may be quite different than what the future generations themselves 
would have chosen based on policy approach 2 using the rate r that is appropriate for 
their own decisions.  Thus, use of the preferential rate r'  in effect overrides the 
preferences that the future generation itself would have with respect to different time 
streams of benefits and costs. 
Problems also arise if we generalize these concerns to the very long term.  There 
is also not just one future generation.  If the next future generation gets a preferential 
discount rate of r'  < r, should not also give the subsequent future generation a preferential 18 
rate of r' '  < r?  And so on.  For much that same reason that r'  < r will create anomalous 
results for the current generation versus the next future generation, this approach of r' '  < r'  
< r will likewise create anomalous results for the next future generation compared to the 
subsequent future generation. 
 
4.  Office of Management and Budget Discount Rate Guidelines 
The guidelines for discounting issued by the OMB quite properly have 
emphasized the fundamental economic determinants of discounting.  Although for 
decades economists have generated elegant models for proper discounting practices, such 
as explorations of the social rate of discount,
25 the dominant approach has been the 
private opportunity cost of capital.
26  Nevertheless, as I indicate below, OMB has begun 
to show some ill-advised and ill-defined flexibility with respect to intergenerational 
effects. 
The OMB has articulated the main principles for discounting policy effects.  
OMB Circular A-94 provides general guidance for the basic mechanics of discounting.
27  
Although the OMB discount rate had long been set at 10 percent, this 1992 document 
issued the following requirement:  
Constant-dollar benefit-cost analyses of proposed investments and 
regulations should report net present value and other outcomes determined 
using a real discount rate of 7 percent.  This rate approximates the 
marginal pretax rate of return on an average investment in the private 
sector in recent years.
28 
 
                                                 
25 Stephen A. Marglin, “The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. LXXVII, #1, (February 1963), pp. 95-111. 
26 See Geoffrey Heal, supra note 24, for a superb review of the discounting literature. 
27 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rate for Benefit-Cost 
Analysis of Federal Programs, 10/29/92. 
28 Id. at 8. 19 
Although OMB did not document the justification for the 7 percent rate, it appears 
to be too high a rate even in 1992.  If in fact the real, inflation-adjusted rate of return was 
7 percent, it was presumably because analyses justifying that rate included investments 
that yielded a premium for risk.  Such risk premiums should not be included, as returns 
for the riskiness of an asset is not a reflection of the intertemporal rate of tradeoff per se.   
The discount rate I advocate is the riskless rate of return.
29 Doing so does not 
imply that uncertainty is irrelevant. Suppose that the benefits of a government policy are 
highly uncertain, as for example in the case of levees to protect New Orleans from floods 
due to future hurricanes. Proper analysis of program benefits based on the willingness to 
pay of beneficiaries for the uncertain benefits will reflect a risk premium for these 
uncertain benefits, which can then be discounted using a riskless rate. While some 
observers have advocated using a discount rate that incorporates uncertainty,
30 doing so 
necessarily imposes the mathematical structure of the discounting process that may not 
track the effect of uncertainty over time. In general, there is no reason to assume that the 
risk premiums associated with regulatory benefit trajectories have the same mathematical 
structure as would emerge from the exponential discounting function. 
A good measure of the riskless rate of return is the government bond rate.  The 
1992 three-month Treasury bill rate was 3.45 percent,
31 which is just above the inflation 
rate in 1992 of 3.0 percent.
32  The ten-year Treasury security interest rate was 7.01 
                                                 
29 The appropriateness of using the riskless rate of return is shown by Kenneth I. Arrow and Robert C. 
Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, American Economic Review 60:364-
378. 
30 See Louis Kaplow, “Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and 
Efficiency,” 2006, this issue. 
31 Economic Report of the President 2005, at 296. 
32 Id. at 283. 20 
percent, which is just 4 percent higher than the inflation rate.
33  Moreover, returns on 
longer-term bond issues for durations such as ten years will include a premium for 
possible increases in inflation as well as a liquidity premium to compensate investors for 
having their funds tied up for that long period.  Regardless of what government bond 
reference point we use, the OMB Circular A-94 7 percent rate is too high. 
In 2003 OMB revised the guidance in its OMB Circular A-4.
34  The calculations 
provided by OMB to justify its policy used average performance of ten-year Treasury 
notes and the rate of change in the CPI.  Subtracting the CPI increase from the bond rate 
yielded a real rate of return of 3.1 percent.
35  Why OMB did not report a similar 
calculation in 1992 to justify the 7 percent rate is never explained.  Despite providing the 
2003 analysis in support of a 3 percent rate, OMB concluded nevertheless that agencies 
should use the earlier 7 percent rate as well as the 3 percent rate of discount.
36 
What useful purpose might be served by continuing to perform analyses using the 
inappropriate 7 percent rate?  Using that rate may enable policymakers to compare the 
efficacy of proposed new policies with earlier policies that were evaluated using the 7 
percent discount rate.  However, presumably past policy decisions have been completed 
and should be regarded as fixed costs.  Should tradeoffs between current and post policies 
ever arise, the analysis should be done at a more meaningful 3 percent rate applied to all 
policies being considered. 
A second possible function of the 7 percent rate may be strategic.  That higher 
rate typically will reduce benefits compared to costs and consequently frame the policy 
                                                 
33 Id. at 296. 
34 OMB Circular A-4, Sept. 17, 2003. 
35 Id. at 33-34. 
36 Id. at 34, states: “For regulatory analysis, you should provide estimates of net benefits using both 3 
percent and 7 percent.” 21 
debate in a manner that enables OMB to impose more discipline on spending and 
regulations.   
A third possibility is that OMB is subject to a behavioral irrationality.  Continued 
reference to a 7 percent rate may simply reflect an anchoring bias reflecting the earlier 
discount rate mind set.  Historically, OMB has used excessively high discount rates, so 
the movement to the pair of discount rates at 3 percent and 7 percent reflects a partial 
adjustment toward a rate that bears a plausible relationship to the real rate of return on 
capital. 
The official OMB guidance regarding intergenerational discounting has evolved 
over time.  The 1992 budget Circular A-94 does not make any explicit provision for 
intergenerational concerns.  The 2003 Circular A-4 notes that inconsistencies may arise 
from using a preferential rate for intergenerational discounting, but nevertheless 
concludes by giving agencies leeway with respect to such discounting: “If your rule will 
have important intergenerational benefits or costs you might consider using a lower but 
positive discount rate in addition to calculating net benefits using discount rates of 3 and 
7 percent.”
37 In this single sentence, OMB apparently has given carte blanche to a broad 
range of economically irrational discounting practices. 
What form such a departure from standard discounting norms should take is not 
specified, nor does OMB specify the extent of such a departure.  Should all agencies use 
the same preferential discount rate for all effects on future generations?  Does the timing 
of the effects influence the acceptable discount rate?  None of these issues are resolved 
by the OMB guidelines.  What is clear is that the OMB has given agencies the leeway to 
                                                 
37 OMB Circular A-4, at 36. 22 
adopt the discounting policy approach 4 from Table 1, with all the attendant problems 
that deviation creates. 
 
5.  Discount Rate Performance by Regulatory Agencies 
While the OMB guidelines are clear, an interesting policy question is the extent to 
which agencies adhere to these guidelines and apply consistent discounting practices.  
Some agencies might use a very high rate to emphasize the importance of immediate 
payoffs and to decrease the salience of adverse distant policy effects, whereas other 
agencies might use a low rate to decrease the relative weight placed on immediate costs. 
Less than a decade ago, an inventory of discounting practices found that there 
were wide disparities in the discount rates federal agencies used, notwithstanding official 
OMB guidance.
38  In light of the quite strong and explicit directive that the OMB now 
provides, do agencies continue to display widely varying choices in the rates of discount 
they select? 
The set of regulations I chose to make this comparison was the list of all 
regulations from Table 1-4 of OMB’s Draft 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and 
Benefits of Federal Regulation.
39  Thus, rather than selecting a few regulations at random, 
this assessment considers every regulation OMB reported to the U.S. Congress in 2005. 
The results of this review appear in Table 2.  The first column lists the rule, the 
third column lists its status, and the second-to-last column lists the discount rate used.  
Notably, the OMB guidance of 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates seems to have 
taken hold.  Seven of the regulations are evaluated using both rates. 
                                                 
38 Edward R. Morrison, “Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 
University of Chicago Law Review, 65 (1998): 1333-1369. 
39 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/inforeg/2005_cb/draft_2005_cb_report.pdf. 23 
In some instances, the regulatory agency expresses a rationale for their choice or a 
preference between the two rates.  For example, the interim final rule for Medicare 
Prescription Drug Discount Card cites OMB Circular A-4 and indicates a preference for 
the 3 percent rate: “The Office of Management and Budget has indicated that a 3 percent 
discount rate better approximates the individual rate of time preference.”
40 
The next set of four regulations in Table 2 all used a 7 percent discount rate.  Each 
of these regulations was a final rule, so that there was continuing use of the earlier 7 
percent rate that presumably had been adopted in analyses at earlier stages of the policy 
process.  In these instances the agency presumably simply chose not to redo the earlier 
analysis once the policy review by OMB was completed.  It is, however, notable that the 
7 percent rate does conform with OMB Budget Circular A-94. 
The next regulation did not indicate an explicit discount rate, but the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did use a discounting approach in its analysis.  
More specifically, EPA’s discussion of Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source 
Performance Standards for the Meat and Poultry Products Point Source Category noted 
there was use of a discount rate for costs and benefits, though the specific rates are not 
indicated.
41 
The final 19 regulations in Table 2 did not include any discussion of discounting.  
That pattern could occur in four ways.  First, the agency might claim that the regulation 
was issued to address an emergency situation, such as mad cow disease.  Indeed, that 
claim was made for both USDA meat regulations: “The emergency situation surrounding 
                                                 
40 68 FR69913. 
41 In particular, EPA noted: “EPA’s closure analysis is a discounted cash flow analysis that compares the 
costs during a 16-year period from 2005 to 2020 to the earnings accumulated during that same period.  This 
analysis discounts both costs and earnings with the facility-specific discount rate reported in the detailed 
questionnaire.” 69 FR 54511. 24 
this rulemaking makes timely compliance with Executive Order 12866 and the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) impracticable.”
42  Second, an analysis 
using discounting may have been undertaken, but the discount rates were not reported in 
the final rule, as with the EPA National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Stationary Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines
43 and EPA’s 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Surface Coating of 
Automobile and Light-Duty Trucks.
44  Indeed, most of the regulations in which discount 
rates are not reported are final rules, so that any analysis that was done presumably was 
an earlier stage.  Third, in some contexts there may be no discount rate indicated because 
benefits and costs are annual events, so that if the regulation is worthwhile in any given 
year, it is desirable in all years.
45 Fourth, the agency may not have employed discounting 
because it was too difficult to accurately quantify costs or benefits.
46 
 
6.  Discounting and the Value of Statistical Life 
A primary component of these regulations is the reduction to risks to life and 
health.  Using discounting in this context has been a prominent concern in the literature 
and may at first glance appear to be indefensible.
47  Aren’t we in effect saying that lives 
                                                 
42 69 FR 1871 and 69 FR 1883. 
43 69 FR 33498. 
44 69 FR 22619. 
45 For example, this is true for DOL-ESA’s Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, 
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 FR 22122.  
46 For example, in the Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulations, DOT-OST wrote: “The analysis 
relied on a qualitative assessment of the costs and benefits of the proposed rules, because we did not have 
information of the kind and detail necessary for a quantification of those benefits and costs.” 69 FR 1026. 
47 The role of discounting of human lives is a central theme of Revesz, supra note 3, 941, as well as a large 
literature. See, among others; John K. Horowitz and Richard T. Carson, “Discounting Statistical Lives,” 3 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 403, 412 n.2 (1990); Clifford S. Russell, “Discounting Human Life” (Or, 
the Anatomy of a Moral-Economic Issue), Resources, Winter 1986, at 8; Maureen L. Cropper and Frances 
G. Sussman, “Valuing Future Risks to Life,” 19 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
160 (1990); John A. Cairns and Marjon M. van der Pol, “Saving Future Lives: A Comparison of Three 25 
saved today are worth more than those saved in the future?  And with very long-term 
effects on human life, aren’t we devaluing entire future generations’ lives? 
To clarify the issues at stake and to get our thinking straight, it is useful to 
examine the different contexts in which discounting enters in the valuation of morbidity 
risk reductions.  Discounting takes on several different roles with respect to the valuation 
of regulatory efforts that reduce mortality risks.  To clarify these different implications 
and functions of discounting, I will distinguish three different situations: i) the role of 
discounting for the value of statistical life (VSL) for people of different ages at a point in 
time, ii) discounting the VSL for a person alive now and for that same person at some 
future time period, and iii) discounting the VSL in the future for someone not already 
alive.  Many of these scenarios have arisen in previous treatments, and it is useful to 
clarify how I would address each of them.
48 
Consider first the appropriate VSLs for people of different ages alive today.  In 
particular, should we take a different approach to the VSL for someone age 30 at time 0, 
which I denote by VSL (30,0), versus a 60-year-old at the current time, which I denote by 
VSL (60,0)?  This simple starting point enables us to separate the life expectancy 
differences by age from the timing effects. 
There are two possible economics approaches to answering this question, one of 
which I believe is correct.  First, one could undertake a form of quantity adjustment for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Discounting Models,” 6 Health Economics 341, 343 (1997); Maureen L. Cropper and Paul R. Portney, 
“Discounting and the Evaluation of Lifesaving Programs,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 3(4) (1990), 
369-79; and Maureen L. Cropper, Sema Aydede, and Paul R. Portney, “Preferences for Life Saving 
Programs: How the Public Discounts Time and Age,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8 (1994), 243-265; 
Maureen L. Cropper, Sema Aydede, and Paul R. Portney, “Rates of Time Preference for Saving Lives,” 
American Economic Review, 82 (1002), 469-472; and Magnus Johanneson and Per-Olov Johansson, 
“Saving Lives in the Present Versus Saving Lives in the Future—Is There a Framing Effect?” Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty 15 (1997), 167-176. 
48 The most prominent treatment in the legal literature of scenarios such as these appears in Revesz, supra 
note 3, at 958. 26 
the VSL.  Older people have shorter remaining life expectancy, so that mortality-reducing 
efforts are purchasing less of a quantity of life extension.  Let the VSL be the sum of a 
series of annual value of statistical life year (VSLY) components, so that each year is 
equally valued apart from the influence of discounting.  Although a coauthor and I 
introduced the quantity-adjusted value of life concept that is mathematically equivalent to 
VSLY, we never showed theoretically or empirically that each year of life has a constant 
value.
49 Rather, that formulation was an untested assumption of the model. After some 


















To implement this formula, one can take the VSL implied by wage-fatality-risk tradeoffs 
for the average worker and calculate the constant annual VSLY implied by the VSL 
estimates.  Assuming individuals of all age groups have the same VSLY, which may even 
appear generous to older individuals given age-related declines in health status, one can 
calculate for the person at age 60 the VSL associated with the discounted stream of 
annual VSLY values that remain.  In effect, all VSL amounts are simply the present value 
of the stream of VSLY levels, so that the VSL calculated using this approach always 
declines with age. 
In a series of papers my coauthors and I estimated rates of time preference with 
respect to years of life as revealed by decisions in the labor market and product market. 
These analyses shared a common approach. Each year of life was assumed to have the 
                                                 
49 See Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, “The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life,” Economic Inquiry, 
XXVI (3) (1988), 369-388. 
50 Joseph Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi, “Age Variations in the Value of Statistical Life,” Harvard Olin Center 
Working Paper 468 (2004). 27 
same value, and the rate of discount was assumed to be the same for all workers. Thus, 
the focus was on averages across the population rather than the possible heterogeneity of 
these values for people of difference age. 
Four of these studies dealt with labor market decisions involving fatality risks. 
The first of these studies found that workers discounted years of life at a rate of 10-12 
percent, implying a value per year of life of $170,000 in 1986 prices.
51 A second article 
used a much more elaborate econometric model and found a rate of time preferences with 
respect to future years of life of 11 percent.
52 Subsequent labor market studies using a 
variety of other econometric approaches yielded implicit rates of discount of 2 percent
53 
and a range from 1 percent to 14 percent.
54 
My product market estimates of implicit rates of time preference were quite 
similar to the labor market results. The discount rate implied by auto safety choices 
involving used car preferences yielded discount rate estimates for fatality risks from 11 to 
17 percent.
55 
There are number of conclusions and cautionary observations that emerge from 
this set of studies. First, at least at some point the quantity of life at risk does matter. 
Otherwise the estimated discount rate would be infinite. Second, the estimated rates of 
time preferences across these studies varies from 1 percent to 14 percent, which is at least 
a plausible range given observed market rates of interest. Third, even if we accept these 
                                                 
51 Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, “The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life,” Economic Inquiry, XXVI 
(3) (1988), 369-388. 
52 W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore, “Rates of Time Preference and Valuations of the Duration of 
Life,” Journal of Public Economics, 38 (1989), 297-317. 
53 Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, “Discounting Environmental Health Risks: New Evidence and 
Policy Implications,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 18 (1990), 551-562. 
54 Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, “Models for Estimating Discount Rates for Long-Term Health 
Risks Using Labor Market Data,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 3 (1990), 381-401. 
55 Mark K. Dreyfus and W. Kip Viscusi, “Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valuations of 
Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency,” Journal of Law and Economics, XXXVIII (1), 1995, 79-105. 28 
results at face value, they imply that the value of a statistical life does not plummet with 
age. Consider a discount rate of 7 percent, which is at the midpoint of the estimated 
discount rate range. A person with an infinite lifespan would lose (1/.07) VSLY, or 14.3 
VSLY. If there were only 10 years of remaining life expectancy, there would be a loss of 
7.0 VSLY, or almost half the value with an infinite lifespan.
56 Losing 1 year of life is 
worth one-fourteenth of a VSL. From the standpoint of individual preferences, short 
remaining lifespans are worth a great deal—much more than the proportion of life at risk. 
Several caveats are also in order. The results of these studies do not imply that 
each life year has some VSLY value that is constant and that the VSL is the present value 
of these individual year amounts. Each of these features is an assumption of the models, 
not an empirical result. Second, the findings of these studies and similar investigations 
should be treated with caution because they did not allow for variations in risk levels with 
age. Moreover, the nature of the time variations that were permitted imposed 
considerable structure on the possible results. The more recent studies that I discuss 
below recognize time variations in risk and permit VSL to vary across the life cycle. 
These new studies permit the VSL to rise and fall with age, whereas early studies 
required that VSL decline with age. 
In ongoing research, I have taken advantage of the capabilities offered by more 
refined fatality risk data and have written with coauthors a series of papers on age 
variations in the VSL.
57  Although the VSL displays an inverted-U shaped relationship 
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57 See Aldy and Viscusi, supra note 50; Joseph E. Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi, “Adjusting the Value of Life 
for Age and Cohort Effects,” Resources for the Future, Working Paper (2006); and Thomas J. Kniesner, W. 
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with respect to age, the curve is fairly flat.  As a result, the VSL (60,0) exceeds the VSL 
(20,0).  Going back to first principles, the VSL is simply the individual’s wage-risk 
tradeoff.  A person’s reluctance to incur risks may be quite substantial even as life 
expectancy shortens, in part because of increases in wealth over time.  As a result, the 
appropriate way to value VSL (60,0) compared to VSL (30,0) is to use the explicit VSL 
amounts pertinent to these age groups rather than to construct a VSL based on a 
discounted stream of VSLY values derived from VSL (30,0).  Doing so takes the 
influence of discounting out of this VSL calculation. 
The second discounting VSL situation involves assessing the VSL of the person 
who is now 30 years old thirty years from now, which is a situation that might arise when 
dealing with risks for which there is a substantial latency period or a delay before a policy 
is enacted.
58  The first component of this benefit value is the VSL for a similar 60-year-
old person at the current time, or VSL (60,0).  The next step is to bring this amount back 
to present value, leading to VSL (60,0) / (1 + r)
30.  Third, if income levels are expected to 
grow over time, given the positive income elasticity of VSL of about 0.5 to 0.6,
59 the 
VSL will grow at some positive growth rate g.  Thus, the appropriate VSL (60,30) value 
for this situation is VSL (60,0)(1 + g)
30/(1 + r)
30, which is approximately VSL (60,0)/(1 + 
r – g)
30, which is a formulation William Evans and I derived two decades ago.
60 
When I first introduced government agencies to the VSL approach in 1982
61, I 
was asked whether it is appropriate to discount lives at all.  I had two responses to this 
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issue, which still appears to be a matter of controversy.
62  First, what is being discounted 
is not lives, but a monetary amount equal to the willingness to pay to reduce risks to 
life.
63 Second, it is possible to avoid discounting altogether by changing our frame of 
reference.  If we don’t discount the VSL at year 30, we could ask instead if it is 
worthwhile to incur some cost c to obtain the benefit of one VSL at that time.  But after 
30 years, the cost c will have a terminal value c(1 + r)
30, which leads to the same benefit-
cost analysis requirement, as VSL/(1 + r)
30 > c.
64 
Now consider the third case of someone who is not alive today but who will be 
saved in 30 years at age 30.  The appropriate value can be calculated using the same 
general approach as with the second situation, taking the VSL (30,0) as the reference 
point.  Thus, in terms of our notation, we have 
  VSL (30,30) = VSL(30,0)(1 + g)
30/(1 + r)
30, 
which is approximately 
  VSL (30,30) = VSL(30,0)/(1 + r - g)
30. 
If the growth rate in income is expected to be low, then the benefit assessment can be 
simplified by dropping g from the calculation. 
 
7.  Policy Practices for Intergenerational Discounting 
OMB guidance has given agencies leeway in how they discount effects on future 
generations.  As a result, it is instructive to examine how agencies have used this 
discretion.  Notably, none of the regulations in Table 2 involved intergenerational effects.  
                                                 
62 See Revesz, supra note 3. 
63 Much the same point is made by Cass R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, “On Discounting Regulatory 
Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity,” AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
Working Paper 05-08 (2005), at 2. 
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There is currently a dearth of policies with truly long-term implications. The two 
examples I consider in this section are stratospheric ozone regulations and radioactivity 
exposure standards for nuclear waste storage at Yucca Mountain.  A common feature of 
these regulations is that the VSL is of central importance, as is concern for future 
generations.  What differs is the length of the time horizon captured by these future 
concerns, as the future extends to 2075 in the regulatory analysis stratospheric ozone 
regulation and a million years in the analysis of nuclear waste storage at Yucca 
Mountain.  Each of these examples yields a common lesson, which is that federal 
agencies need to develop a sounder economic approach to their treatment of discounting 
intergenerational effects. 
 
7.1  Stratospheric Ozone Regulations 
The problem that very distant time periods create for regulatory analyses is 
apparent from EPA’s 1987 analysis of its proposed rule, Protection of Stratospheric 
Ozone.
65  That regulation would have controlled a wide range of applications of CFC and 
halons, such as refrigerants.  The benefits, which were calculated to the year 2075, 
included reductions in skin cancer deaths, cataracts, crop damage, damage to fish, 
damage to polymers, and sea level rise damage.  
For concreteness, consider how EPA addressed the skin cancer mortality risks.  
EPA undertook a sensitivity analysis with three scenarios: i) a high benefits scenario of 1 
percent discount rate, $4 million value of life, and 3.4 percent annual growth in the value 
of life; ii) a medium scenario with a 2 percent discount rate and a $3 million value of life 
                                                 
65 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Part 82, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone [FRL-3284-
9], December 14, 1987, proposed rule. See 53 FR 30566. 32 
that increases by 1.7 percent per year; and iii) a low scenario with a 6 percent discount 
rate and a $2 million value of life that increases by 0.85 percent per year.  The idea of 
undertaking a sensitivity analysis is a desirable feature of the analysis.  The choice of the 
value of statistical life was perhaps less well-defined at that time than it is now, though I 
believe the $2 million figure was certainly too low even for that era.
66  EPA’s discussion 
of the final rule cited my work in the 1980s indicating that the appropriate VSL was 
much higher than the rate they had employed in the preliminary regulatory impact 
analysis.
67 
Setting aside the choice of the value-of-life number, consider the implications of 
their combination of discounting assumptions and growth rate assumptions.  For the high 
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Consequently, there is no net discounting at all, as instead the present value per life saved 
increases at a compound growth rate of 2.4 percent annually.  To put this growth rate in 
perspective, after 75 years this approach makes the “discounted” VSL worth 5.9 times as 
much as the VSL for the current period.  Saving one future life in 75 years will 
consequently count about as much as saving six lives today.  There is no valid economic 
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rationale for this preferential treatment of future generations.  An exhaustive exploration 
of the different ways we could sacrifice now to make people better off in 2075 could 
easily divert all our risk-reducing resources to making our descendents’ lives safer, given 
that their lives count about six times as much as lives in the current generation. 
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The almost-identical choice of the growth rate and the discount rate fall short of being 
exactly offsetting, as perhaps EPA wanted to have at least some net nonzero discounting.  
Using this approach, a statistical life saved in 75 years has a present value of 0.80 of its 
value today. 
The final low benefits scenario best captures the idea that there should be 
discounting.  The relatively high 7 percent rate that was recommended by OMB in that 
era is the starting point for the analysis.  The approach leads to a net discount rate of 5.15 
percent.  A statistical life saved after 75 years will have a present value of 0.02 times a 
VSL today.  Had EPA used a more realistic base discount rate of 3 percent and coupled 
that assumption with its chosen low growth figure of 0.85 percent VSL growth, the net 
discount rate would be 2.15 percent, and the VSL in 75 years would be 0.20 times the 
value of saving a life today. 
 
7.2  Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Storage 34 
One of the most consequential and bizarre regulatory analysis pertaining to future 
generations is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2005 analysis of 
standards for storage of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
68 The standards 
involved criteria for proposed storage of nuclear wastes at an underground storage facility 
at Yucca Mountain, which is about 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas.
69 The nuclear 
waste repository would be about 300 meters underground, with an additional 300 to 500 
meters between the repository and the water table. The purpose of the proposed 
regulation is to establish health and safety standards for this repository of radioactive 
material.
70 
Before considering the details of EPA’s regulatory analysis, it is useful to ask 
what an ideal regulatory analysis might look life. Because Yucca Mountain does not 
create nuclear wastes but simply stores them, a pertinent question to ask is how much this 
site will reduce the risks from nuclear wastes as opposed to storage at current locations. 
This question never arises in the EPA analysis, as the mind set is with respect to 
incremental risks from a zero baseline risk. What EPA should have done is explore the 
risk-risk tradeoffs involved rather than adopt the implicit fiction that we now live in a 
riskless nuclear-free world. 
Using such a framework, EPA should have analyzed the incremental cancer risk 
reductions associated with different standards, the populations affected by these risks, the 
value of the statistical lives saved by more stringent standards, and the discounted value 
of the costs and benefits for standards of different stringency. Somewhat strikingly, 
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discounting of effects never even enters the analysis despite the use of a policy time 
horizon that goes well beyond that of science fiction fantasies. 
The thought process underlying the proposed regulation bears a strong similarity 
to the methodology used by EPA for deciding whether hazardous waste sites should be 
cleaned up by its Superfund program.
71 An individual risk approach guides the site 
cleanup decisions. If a current or hypothetical future individual subjected to a reasonable 
maximum exposure could be exposed to a lifetime cancer risk of 1/10,000, the site must 
be cleaned up.
72 If the individual risk is between 1/10,000 and 1/1,000,000, cleanup is 
discretionary. Note that nobody need actually be exposed to the risk. The number of 
people affected by the risk does not enter into the decision, so that risks to populations 
are not the matter of concern, but only the individual risk reference point. In contrast, a 
benefit-cost approach would multiply the cancer risk by the size of the exposed 
population, weight the values by the pertinent VSL, and then discount the result. 
The EPA Yucca Mountain analysis is in a similar vein but at one additional level 
of abstraction as it does not consider the cancer risk probability, only the level of the 
radioactive dose. In particular, the proposed standard is split into two parts. For the next 
10,000 years the allowable dose is 15 millirems per year, while after 10,000 years and up 
to 1 million years the allowable dose is 350 millirems per year.
73 In each instance, the 
reference person is that for the reasonably maximally exposed individual,
74 just as 
Superfund focuses on the reasonable maximum exposure for an individual.
75 The 
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reasonably maximally exposed individual need not be a real person but instead is a 
“theoretical representative of a future population group” based on a “concept to protect 
those individuals most at risk…”
76 
If we adopt the approach that only a single real or hypothetical individual matters, 
how much weight should a risk to one person carry in a benefit-cost assessment? Using a 
discount rate of 3 percent, one case of cancer 10,000 years from now has a discounted 
value of (1/1.03)
10,000, or 4.2 x 10
-129. Thus, even if the entire current U.S. population 
were crammed into Yucca Mountain and exposed to a lethal dose of radiation, there 
would be a negligible value for the number of discounted cases of cancer that could be 
prevented by eliminating this risk. 
But even these minuscule discounted cancer risks overstate the actual risks for 
three principal reasons. First, the maximum possible risk to an individual greatly exceeds 
the average risk to an exposed individual, as documented for Superfund.
77 Second, 
exposure to radioactive risks is a choice. People need not choose to build houses at the 
Yucca Mountain site or rely on drinking water contaminated by radioactive waste. Third, 
even taking the exposure limits at face value, my example above greatly overstates the 
severity of the risk. Exposure to radioactivity is not fatal at the 15 millirem per year level 
for the 10,000 year standard and at the 350 millirem standard for the period from 10,000 
years to 1 million years. 
To justify the exposure limits, EPA does not calculate the exposed populations or 
risk probabilities but instead gives risk reference points. Consider, for example, the 
comparable background risk for residents of Colorado, which EPA views as comparable 
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to Nevada in terms of climatic features.
78 The average background radiation level is 700 
millirems per year,
79 which is double the million year exposure standard and almost 50 
times the 10,000 year standard. The current average background risk level in the U.S. is 
300 millirems per year.
80 The incremental risks from Yucca Mountain will be far from 
lethal and in fact were designed to keep the total risk from background risks and Yucca 
Mountain to the maximally exposed person at or below 350 millirems per year,
81 which is 
half the background radiation dose Colorado residents currently experience. Even based 
on total risk levels, the standard is quite stringent and makes no apparent sense. 
Moreover, total risk should not be the focal point of any benefit-cost analysis, 
however rudimentary it might be. What matters are the incremental risks and benefits 
associated with a policy. Background risks will be present with or without the risks of the 
Yucca Mountain site. To the extent that dose-response relationships are nonlinear, the 
risk calculations can account for any influence of background risks, but the focus will be 
on incremental risks associated with different regulatory options. 
EPA’s fanciful time horizons of 10,000 years and 1 million years are temporal 
reference points that would have dropped out of any analysis had EPA engaged in any 
reasonable discounting of effects. To put these time periods in perspective, recorded 
human history spans about 5,000 years, and homo sapiens first walked the earth about 
120,000 years ago. 
How could EPA have been led to propose a regulation for the next million years 
based on our current, certainly primitive technologies for dealing with risk that surely 
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will be less effective than technologies that will emerge in the future? EPA cites 
approvingly the following guidelines offered by the National Academy of Public 
Administration: 
To inform decision-making, NAPA defined four principles: 
·  Trustee: Every generation has obligations as trustee to protect the 
interests of future generations; 
·  Sustainability: No generation should deprive future generations of the 
opportunity for a quality of life comparable to its own; 
·  Chain of Obligation: Each generation’s primary obligation is to provide 
for the needs of the living and succeeding generations. Near-term 
concrete hazards have priority over long-term hypothetical hazards; 
·  Precautionary: Actions that pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or 
catastrophic consequences should not be pursued unless there is some 
countervailing need to benefit either current or future generations.
82 
 
It is useful to consider each of these principles in turn. The trustee obligation 
appears to be reasonable insofar as it implies that future generation effects should matter 
when conducting regulatory analysis. 
The second requirement of sustainability is less compelling. Is there no 
sufficiently large current benefit that would make a policy desirable if it imposed a very 
small risk that the quality of life for some future generation might be an infinitesimal 
amount lower than our own? Rigid requirements of sustainability do not permit any such 
tradeoffs and are antithetical to a balanced benefit-cost approach. “Sustainability” is also 
an ill-defined environmentalist battle cry. What does it mean for the future quality of life 
to be “comparable” to our own? Must they have access to the same natural resources, the 
same resources per capita, or sufficient resources to have the same life expectancy? How 
can we even tell if their quality of life is the same as our own? We cannot readily take 
ourselves forward in time to determine the utility future generations will experience 
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within the context of their civilizations. Going back in time, at least from my vantage 
point, I believe we are better off today than we were before indoor plumbing and 
electricity even though there surely has been tremendous degradation of our natural 
resources. The task of ascertaining whether decisions today will lead people to have a 
lower quality of life in 10,000 years or a million years cannot ignore the role of 
technological progress and change in lifestyle that we are ill-equipped to predict. We 
don’t know the absolute levels of their quality of life, how much our decisions today will 
alter that quality, or how we might go about making a sensible intertemporal 
interpersonal comparison. The sustainability objective is both inefficient and inoperable. 
The chain of obligation principle expands on the trustee notion and indicates that 
current effects are the primary obligation. Proper discounting practices will ensure that 
appropriate weight is given to current and future effects. The greater weight the principle 
urges be given to “near-term” hazards seems to be broadly consistent with some type of 
discounting. 
Where I depart from that principle is with respect to the greater weight that should 
be given to concrete risks as opposed to long-term hypothetical risks. On the positive 
side, this guidance avoids the excessive attention to ambiguous risks that are not well 
understood.
83 However, suppose that we face two types of risks—a certain risk of 
1/10,000 and a subjectively assessed risk of 1/1,000 based on scientists’ best judgments. 
The mean level of the risk should be our guide, not the precision of the risk estimate. This 
basic principle of Bayesian statistical decision theory
84 will ensure that we don’t ignore 
risks when there are not large sample sizes available to undertake classical statistical tests 
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for policy choices such as anti-terrorism efforts. Risks may be real, even though they are 
not certain and precisely estimated. 
The final precautionary principle is either innocuous or inefficient depending on 
its interpretation. No risk of any kind of harm, whether irreversible or not, should be 
undertaken unless there is some offsetting benefit. But irreversibilities per se need not be 
a barrier to action. In a series of papers I have examined the role of environmental 
irreversibilities and found that they do not alter the decision analysis problem in a way 
that is too sweeping.
85 Moreover, the existence of irreversibilities sometimes leads to a 
need to over-regulate risks and other times makes under-regulation optimal.
86 How the 
irreversibilities affect the analysis or the appropriate policy decision is often ambiguous. 
What is clear is that there are threats to sound decisions that will emerge if we let our 
choices be guided by arbitrary commitments to precaution or sustainability rather than 
benefit-cost tests.
87 
EPA’s Yucca Mountain analysis embodies the kinds of inefficient policy 
prescriptions that emerge when policies are based on lofty but misguided principles of 
intergenerational equity rather than a sound benefit-cost approach. Had the agency 
assessed costs and benefits properly and discounted these value appropriately, the 
emphasis would have shifted from arbitrary exposure thresholds for hypothetical, 
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maximally exposed individuals to the discounted economic value of the expected number 
of cancer cases that will be averted through more stringent standards. 
 
8.  The Challenge of Hyperbolic Discounting 
My discussion thus far has been normative. What discount rate should the 
government use in valuing regulatory benefits and costs over time? Whether policies that 
are considered for such assessment will, of course, depends on the political pressures 
exerted by the citizenry. If, for example, there is no constituency for attempting to reduce 
the risk of global climate change, then policies to combat global warming may not even 
be considered for evaluation. Thus, it is useful to explore what the behavioral aspects of 
intertemporal preferences and whether the pressures they exert on policy will lead to 
rational intertemporal political decisions. 
 The conventional discounting approach known as “exponential discounting” 
dominates economic theory.  Whether people behave in a manner consistent with this 
theory is a quite different matter.  Economists have long challenged the behavioral 
accuracy of the conventional discounting framework.  In the usual exponential 
discounting case, the rate of discount for payoffs in year t is given by 1 / (1 + r)
t.  
Beginning with the conjecture by Robert Strotz, economists have hypothesized that 
people behave in a myopic manner and put an inordinate weight on immediate rewards.
88  
This phenomenon, which he termed hyperbolic discounting, has led to a considerable 
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experimental literature documenting this form of intertemporal irrationality.
89  A useful 
simple formulation of this framework is the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, in 
which the discount factor is 1 in the initial period, but thereafter is given by ￿ / (1 + r)
t, 
where 0 ￿ ￿ < 1.
90  Thus, all deferred payoffs are scaled down by some factor ￿. 
Using a nationally representative sample, Joel Huber and I recently examined 
whether people exhibited hyperbolic discounting when valuing the environment.
91  The 
survey considered water quality improvements that could occur now, or with a delay of 
two, four, or six years.  For delays of two years, people displayed an average rate of time 
preference ranging from 12.7 percent to 14.3 percent.
92  For delays of four years the 
implicit rate of time preference range was 8.0 to 8.4 percent, while for six years it was 7.9 
to 8.7 percent.  Based on the responses that led to these estimates, it is possibly to 
estimate the quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameter ￿, which was 0.48-0.53 for two-year 
delays and 0.58-0.61 for delays of six years.  Thus, there is evidence of a substantial 
under-evaluation of deferred benefits, which in effect receive a weight of about 50-60 
percent of their correct discounted value that would prevail if people adhered to an 
exponential discount rate. People have a strong preference for policies that generate 
immediate benefits. 
This form of intertemporal irrationality is not simply an intellectual curiosity of 
interest only to economists.  Hyperbolic discounting has potentially far-reaching policy 
consequences because it indicates that people are displaying an irrationally substantial 
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weight on current payoffs compared to the future.  Public support for policies such as 
environmental policies with very long term effects consequently are potentially strongly 
affected by hyperbolic discounting. 
Given that people’s revealed intertemporal preference displays hyperbolic 
discounting, should policy prescriptions for discounting practices reflect these 
preferences?  My view is that this form of intertemporal irrationality should not be 
incorporated in official discounting practices, which instead should be based on the 
opportunity cost of capital rather than the irrational myopic concerns embodied in 
hyperbolic discounting.   
Nevertheless, hyperbolic discounting is of potentially substantial policy 
importance.  The pressure the public exerts on government officials to promote policies 
they prefer will lead to policy outcomes that reflect the public’s risk beliefs and 
preferences, to the extent that policy choices respond to the public’s concerns.  If people 
display an inordinate disregard for all future payoffs, then the political pressures on 
agencies will tilt policies toward efforts with immediate payoffs rather than longer term 
benefits.  This disregard of future effects is not a minor anomaly but may have a 
considerable effect if the public’s hyperbolic discounting parameter ￿ is on the order of 
0.5, in which case they only count future payoffs at half their discounted value. 
The question of whether we should respect the public’s preference even if they 
are irrational is a recurring problem in policy contexts.  For risk perceptions, the question 
of whether policies should address irrational fears has long been a matter of substantial 
debate.
93  In the risk belief context, I have long suggested that policies should be 
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grounded on the actual risk levels rather than public misperceptions of the risk.
94  Just as 
we wouldn’t want to ignore risks because the public is not aware of the risk, we should 
not respond to hazards for which the public has exaggerated beliefs.  This same principle 
should guide policies with respect to intertemporal irrationalities.  The practical result of 
doing so will be more emphasis on policies that offer deferred benefits.  How political 
support can be generated for efforts that involve current sacrifices to achieve these 
deferred rewards may be more problematic. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
My prescription for rational discounting is simple.  The government should base 
the discount rate on the opportunity cost of capital.  The same discount rate should be 
used for benefits and costs.  Policy assessments should recognize the effects on future 
generations fully, and discount those effects consistently with discounting practices for 
the current generation. 
There are several reasons why this approach will not lead to neglect of future 
generations.  Most important is that there should be increased consideration of policies 
with long-term consequences. In much the same way that choices under uncertainty may 
involve neglect of possible states of the world, policy choices may neglect consequences 
in future time periods. There should be a concerted effort to recognize that there are often 
important consequences of regulatory policies on future generations.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, none of the 2005 major regulations listed in Table 2 included regulatory 
analysis of future generation effects.  It may be that distant effects do not play a major 
role in these policies.  But perhaps it is also the case that regulations that protect the 
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future do not make it onto the policy agenda.  Even if there are potential benefits in the 
distant future, if the regulations that would generate these benefits are never proposed and 
issued, the policy process in effect neglects these concerns entirely.  Those concerned 
with the well-being of future generations consequently may have overlooked the more 
fundamental policy problem.  There will be no need to discount any future generation 
effects at either a high discount rate or a low preferential rate if such policies are never 
considered. 
Neglect of the well-being of future generations may be quite rational in many 
instances.  If policies only have near-term effects, then the future consequences do not 
enter.  However, if policies generate the bulk of their net benefits far into the future, then 
the influence of hyperbolic discounting will tend to relegate such efforts to lower-priority 
status in favor of those that generate immediate benefits due to the influence of 
behavioral anomalies in subjective rates of time preference. 
Overcoming such intertemporal myopia may be extraordinarily difficult, given the 
substantial uncertainties involved with very long time horizons.  Waiting to take action 
may provide new information that potentially may resolve the uncertainty as to whether 
policy action is warranted.  The existence of substantial uncertainties may provide a 
plausible basis for the inaction that stems from hyperbolic discounting, making it difficult 
to overcome intertemporal irrationalities.  Once these policies with long term 
consequences are evaluated using a consistent discounting approach, the effects will be 
reduced by the inescapable mathematics of discounting. While meaningful discounting 
will reduce the value of such effects, recognizing the positive income elasticity of 
benefits will be at least partially offsetting. Moreover, even if policy effects a century 46 
from now only have a weight that is 0.05 that of current benefits, if the effects on future 
generations will be truly catastrophic, their discounted value will be consequential as 
well. If the effects will be minor and all but eliminated from concern by rational 
discounting, then there is no compelling rationale for the current generation to make 
sacrifices now. 47 
Table 1 
Time Inconsistency Effects of Different Discount Rates for Different Generations 
 
  Discount Rate (r) 
Discounting Policy  Benefits to Current 
Generation 
Benefits to Future 
Generation 
     
Rational Discounting:     
     
1.  Current Effects, Current Decisions  r  -- 
     
2.  Future Effects, Future Decisions  --  r 
     
Preferential Discounting:     
     
3.  Current Decisions, Future Discounting 
Differential 
r  r'  < r 
i.  No change in within-generation discounting  r  r'  < r, but r within 
future generation 
ii.  Within-generation discounting changes as well  r  r'  < r including within 
future generations 
4.  Current Decisions, Continuous Differential 
Discounting 
r'  < r  r'  < r 
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Table 2 
Discount Rates Used for Regulations from Table 1-4  
of the Draft 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation 
 
Rule  Cite  Status  Date  Agency  Rates Used  Pin Cite 
             
Bar Code Label Requirement for Human Drug 
Products and Biological Products 
69 FR 9120  Final rule  2/26/2004  HHS-FDA  3% and 7%  69 FR 9163 
             
Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 
68 FR 58974  Interim 
final rule 
10/10/2003 HHS-FDA  3% and 7%  68 FR 59063 
             
Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 
68 FR 58894  Interim 
final rule 
10/10/2003 HHS-FDA  3% and 7%  68 FR 58950 
             
Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing 
Ephedrine Alkaloids Adulterated Because They 
Present an Unreasonable Risk 
69 FR 6788  Final rule  2/11/2004  HHS-FDA  3% and 7%  69 FR 6847 
             
Medicare Prescription Drug Discount Card  68 FR 69840  Interim 
final rule 
12/15/2003 HHS-CMS  3% and 7%  68 FR 69912 
             
Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From Nonroad 
Diesel Engines and Fuel 
69 FR 38958  Final rule  6/29/2004  EPA  3% and 7%  69 FR 39107 
             
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System--
Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for 
Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing 
Facilities 
69 FR 41576  Final rule  7/9/2004  EPA  3% and 7%  69 FR 41662 
             
Required Advance Electronic Presentation of Cargo 
Information 
68 FR 68140  Final rule  12/5/2003  DHS-CBP  7%  68 FR 68166 49 
Rule  Cite  Status  Date  Agency  Rates Used  Pin Cite 
             
Area Maritime Security  68 FR 60472  Final rule  10/22/2003 DHS-USCG 7%  68 FR 60479 
             
Vessel Security  68 FR 60483  Final rule  10/22/2003 DHS-USCG 7%  68 FR 60507 
             
Facility Security  68 FR 60515  Final rule  10/22/2003 DHS-USCG 7%  68 FR 60536 
             
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source 
Performance Standards for the Meat and Poultry 
Products Point Source Category 
69 FR 54476  Final rule  9/8/2004  EPA  Rate Not 
Indicated 
 
             
Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum in Domestic 
United States Airspace 
68 FR 61304  Final rule  10/27/2003 DOT-FAA  None   
             
Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for 
Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of 
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle 
69 FR 1862  Interim 
final rule 
1/12/2004  USDA-FSIS None   
             
Meat Produced by Meat/Bone Separation Machinery 
and Meat Recovery (AMR) Systems 
69 FR 1874  Interim 
final rule 
1/12/2004  USDA-FSIS None   
             
General Order Implementing Syria Accountability 
and Lebanese Sovereignty Act of 2003 
69 FR 26766  Final rule  5/14/2004  DOC-BIS  None   
             
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology Program ("US-VISIT"); Authority to 
Collect Biometric Data From Additional Travelers 
and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly Trafficked Land 
Border Ports of Entry 
69 FR 53318  Interim 
rule 
8/31/2004  DHS-BTS  None   
             
Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Early-
Season Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations 
69 FR 52970  Final rule  8/30/2004  DOI-FWS  None   50 
Rule  Cite  Status  Date  Agency  Rates Used  Pin Cite 
             
             
Migratory Bird Hunting; Early Seasons and Bag and 
Possession Limits for Certain Migratory Game Birds 
in the Contiguous United States, Alaska, Hawaii, 
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands 
69 FR 53564  Final rule  9/1/2004  DOI-FWS  None   
             
Migratory Bird Hunting; Migratory Bird Hunting 
Regulations on Certain Federal Indian Reservations 
and Ceded Lands for the 2004-05 Early Season 
69 FR 53990  Final rule  9/3/2004  DOI-FWS  None   
             
Migratory Bird Hunting; Final Frameworks for Late-
Season Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations 
69 FR 57140  Final rule  9/23/2004  DOI-FWS  None   
             
Migratory Bird Hunting; Late Seasons and Bag and 
Possession Limits for Certain Migratory Game Birds 
69 FR 57752  Final rule  9/27/2004  DOI-FWS  None   
             
Migratory Bird Hunting; Regulations on Certain 
Federal Indian Reservations and Ceded Lands for the 
2004-05 Late Season 
69 FR 58236  Final rule  9/29/2004  DOI-FWS  None   
             
Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for 
Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside 
Sales and Computer Employees 
69 FR 22122  Final rule  4/23/2004  DOL-ESA  None   
             
Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in 
High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission 
Pipelines) 
68 FR 69788  Final rule  12/15/2003 DOT-RSPA None   
             
Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations  69 FR 976  Final rule  1/7/2004  DOT-OST  None   
             
HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Standard 
Unique Health Identifier for Health Care Providers 
69 FR 3434  Final rule  1/23/2004  HHS-CMS  None   51 
Rule  Cite  Status  Date  Agency  Rates Used  Pin Cite 
             
             
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Stationary Reciprocating Internal 
Combustion Engines 
69 FR 33473  Final rule  6/15/2004  EPA  None   
             
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants: Plywood and Composite Wood Products; 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the 
Timber Products Point Source Category; List of 
Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity 
Designations, Source Category List 
69 FR 45943  Final rule  7/30/2004  EPA  None   
             
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Industrial, Commercial, and 
Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters 
69 FR 55218  Final rule  9/13/2004  EPA  None   
             
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants: Surface Coating of Automobiles and 
Light-Duty Trucks 
69 FR 22602  Final rule  4/26/2004  EPA  None   
 